2005年5月7日 · The fact remains that the second response/definition of scientific knowledge (epistēmē), that is, true judgment or opinion (alēthēs doxa), introduces the role of the soul (see Dixsaut 2002, Brancacci 2019 and Robinson 2020) and, especially, the problem of the propositional or, at least, linguistic nature of knowledge, as already anticipated ...

2013年9月26日 · This chapter deals with Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge as true judgment. Socrates prefaces his refutation of it with a long examination of false judgment. This examination is an extensive critique of Protagoras’ belief in the impossibility of false judgment.

Theaetetus repeats his definition of knowledge as true judgment but Socrates rejects it by means of the following argument: suppose, he says, the members of a jury are “justly persuaded of some matter, which only an eye-witness could know and which cannot otherwise be known; suppose they come to their decision upon hearsay, forming a true ...

In the dialogue, Socrates and Theaetetus attempt to come up with a definition of episteme, or knowledge, and discuss three definitions of knowledge: knowledge as nothing but perception, knowledge as true judgment, and, finally, knowledge as a true judgment with an account.

2017年1月13日 · 柏拉图的这一经典知识定义后来被归结为JTB公式：『知识=被证明的真信念（Justified true belief（JTB））』。 5. 现代学者的权威解读是：『S知道P，当且仅当：（1）P是真的；（2）S相信P；并且，（3）S被证明处在相信P的状态。

2016年5月6日 · In this second installment on the Theaetetus, I discuss Theaetetus' second and third definitions of knowledge, namely, ‘true judgment’ and then ‘true judgment with the addition of an account’. I offer a brief description of Socrates' intricate examination of these suggestions, concentrating especially on the discussion of false judgment ...

Explain why Socrates thinks that true judgment cannot be sufficient for knowledge. Judgment is based on belief/ opinion and what you might believe might not always be related to the truth. What are the three possible meanings of "having an account" that Socrates considers?

Socrates asks Theaetetus questions that lead them to discuss, and assess, several theories and definitions of knowledge. These are, first, that knowledge is perception, that knowledge is true judgment, and that knowledge is judgment with an account. The dialogue ends with the conclusion that none of these definitions are adequate.

2004年7月28日 · Theories of judgment, whether cognitive (i.e., object-representing, thought-expressing, truth-apt) judgment or practical (i.e., act-representing, choice-expressing, evaluation-apt) judgment, bring together fundamental issues in semantics, logic, cognitive psychology, and epistemology (collectively providing for what can be called the four ...

2013年9月26日 · This chapter explores Theaetetus’ last definition of knowledge as true judgment accompanied by logos (‘account’). Although the three meanings of ‘account’ on offer fail as specifications of what must be added to true judgment to convert it into knowledge, they suggest the need for Socratic dialectic as a prerequisite for knowledge.